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Rather than reenacting every action they observe, preverbal infants adapt their imitative behavior. Although previous studies have
revealed the capability of preverbal infants to imitate selectively, the question about the adaptability of this behavior on an individual
level did not attract considerable scientific attention until now. In the current study, we investigated whether 14-month-old infants
flexibly alternate their imitative response in accordance with a model’s changing physical constraints in a body-part imitation
paradigm. Participants were presented with two novel actions whereby a model illuminated a light-box and turned on a sound-
box, either by using her forehead (head touch) or by sitting on the apparatus (sit-touch). Each participant observed these tasks
in two conditions: once where the model’s hands were occupied and once where her hands were free while executing the head or
sit-touch. Participants were more likely to reenact the observed novel behavior when the model had freely chosen to perform it
than when she had to do so due to physical constraints. Not only did we replicate a number of previous findings, we show here
that preverbal infants adapt their imitative behavior across conditions based on the physical constraints of the model. These results
point towards the adaptable nature of imitative behavior also on an individual level.This ability might be one of the building blocks
for children for learning their social group’s specific action repertoire.
1. Introduction
In order to conform to their social community, humans must
master a wide range of social behaviors. An intense learning
process of these behaviors dominates the first years of an
infant’s life. When it comes to the acquisition of opaque,
arbitrary forms of human culture [1], imitation of others’
behavior is considered a centralmeans of learning. It has been
found that 12- to 18-month-old infants learn one to two novel
actions every day, merely by observing others around them
[2]. Rather than imitating everything and everyone, however,
infants tend to be selective in their imitative behavior, a
tendency that is present from around 12 months of age [3, 4].
Several factors influence infants’ rates of imitation, some
of which concern the action itself (for action component
saliency see [5]), but also the context in which the action is
presented (for pedagogical versus nonpedagogical context see
[6]; for the role of emotional feedback on an action see [7]), as
well as the model’s previously displayed competence [8] and
her group membership [9].
The adaptable nature of imitation becomes evident when
infants face the choice of reenacting a novel action that
they observe under different circumstances. In order to
investigate whether preverbal infants would base their action
choice on efficiency evaluation, Gergely et al. [10] presented
a novel head action (task adapted from [11]) to two groups
of 14-month-olds whereby the model illuminated a light-
box with her forehead. While one group of infants observed
the unusual head action with the model freely resting her
hands next to the lamp (hands-free condition), the other
group observed a demonstration of the identical head action
with the single modification that the model had her hands-
occupied by holding a blanket wrapped around her torso
(hands-occupied condition). Participants were never con-
strained in the response phase which took place with a
one-week delay after the demonstration. The majority (69%)
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of infants in the hands-free condition reenacted this novel
means, whereas only 21% of infants did so in the hands-
occupied condition. According to the teleological account
[12], infants consider others as rational agents who aim to
achieve a goal by the most efficient available means. Conse-
quently, the authors proposed that different imitation rates in
the Gergely et al. [10] study were due to children’s evaluation
of the model’s action plan as being rational in the light of her
available means. While the model did not have any available
means to illuminate the light-box other than her head in the
hands-occupied condition, in the hands-free condition she
could have decided to use her hands instead of her head.
Infants are highly familiar with the efficacy of hand actions
as they explore andmanipulate objects with their hands from
an early age [13]. When they witnessed the head action in
the hands-free condition, infants are taken to assume that
this action was chosen by the model due to it being a more
efficacious means than the familiar option of hand use. The
tendency for infants to be ambitious to learn effective actions
made them copy what they assumed the most efficacious
means in the Gergely et al. [10] study; that is the use of the
hand in the hands-occupied condition, and the use of the
head in the hands-free condition. This leads to the argument
that selective imitation is rational in nature.
To see whether infants engage in rational imitative behav-
ior in object-on-object manipulations or if it is a behavior
specific to body-part imitation, researchers developed other
paradigms that entail tool use and the demonstration of
an action with puppets. In the majority of these stud-
ies, conditions with alternating physical constraints were
introduced to infants in between-subjects designs (e.g., [3]).
The only exception, to the best of our knowledge, is the
study of Buttelmann et al. [14], which involved a tool-use
task presented in a within-subjects design. Here, 14-month-
olds observed the target actions in two conditions that placed
differing observable constraints on an actor. In the response
phase infants got the chance to interact with the apparatuses
and reach a goal by either using the demonstrated (unusual)
tool or to opt for using only their hands (Studies 1 and 2) or
a more usual tool (Study 3). Like Gergely and colleagues [10],
these aforementioned studies found that preverbal infants
were more likely to imitate the model’s object manipulation
when the model had freely chosen to perform the unusual
action, in comparison to when it was the only availablemeans
to achieve the goal due to physical constraints. The question,
however, remains as to whether the adaptable nature of
infants’ imitative responses, which was revealed by Buttel-
mann and colleagues [14], is a characteristic that encompasses
tasks and characterizes true imitative behavior. Since Buttel-
mann et al.’s [14] study utilized a tool-use paradigm, due to
the nature of the task, infants’ responsesmight be perceived as
objectmovement reenactment, whereby it is only the physical
course of the object (i.e., the tool) that is attended, rather
than infants’ reasoning about the choice of action plan itself
in relation to the intended goal [15]. In contrast, body-part
imitation does not face the same criticism and is considered
as true imitation [16].
While a wide range of paradigms has been applied with
a between-subjects design, clearly there is a serious lack
of varying methodologies for studies within the field that
apply a within-subjects design. The application of a body-
part imitation paradigm in a within-subjects design provides
a deeper insight into the extent of selective imitative behavior
on an individual level. It can potentially reveal whether
infants are able to flexibly adapt their body movements in
a similar manner to their tool usage based on their evalu-
ation of others’ actions in various alternating conditions. It
appears that humans’ closest genetic relatives, chimpanzees,
are capable of adapting their imitative response in accordance
with a human demonstrator’s changing physical constraints:
enculturated chimpanzees imitated the use of a specific body
part rationally when given the chance to do so immediately
after they observed a human demonstrator operating novel
apparatuses [17]. In each of three sessions, the chimpanzees
observed two of the three applied unusual actions (head, sit,
or foot action); one in the hands-free and one in the hands-
occupied condition. In order to decrease carry-over effects,
half of the apparatus illuminated upon operation while the
other half produced a sound. Similarly to human infants
in Gergely et al.’s [10] between-subjects design, enculturated
chimpanzees imitated the unusual action to a higher degree
in the hands-free (37.5% of trials) than in the hands-occupied
condition (18.8% of trials) in this within-subjects design.The
current study adapted two tasks (head-touch and sit-touch
task) and the within-subjects design of Buttelmann et al.’s [17]
in order to reveal whether the same flexibility exists also in
human infants on an intrapersonal level.
As for the underlyingmechanisms for adaptable imitative
behavior, besides the teleological account [12] three other
major theories have been proposed to explain why infants
differentially imitate in the light of a model’s alternating
physical constraints. Buttelmann et al. [14] argued that infants
consider the head- or the sit-touch action as the model’s
execution of her intention, that is, her rational choice of
action plan. In the hands-occupied condition, infants infer
the reason forwhy themodel used an unusualmeans: because
her hands were physically constrained she had to use her
head. In the hands-free condition, by contrast, the model’s
rationale for choosing the unusual means is not obvious,
which makes infants imitate the novel action, possibly to
determine why the model formed this intention. Thus, what
makes infants imitate novel actions according to this account
is the lack of apparent reasons for the model’s choice of
means. Rather than attributing mental-state understanding
to infants and considering selective imitation as being based
on a rational decision, Paulus et al. [18] argue in their
two-stage model of infant imitation that, first, it is the
observed action effect that is decisive in whether or not an
observed action will be later imitated. Second, they argue
that infants’ ability to map the observed action onto their
own motor repertoire shapes their imitative behavior. They
claim that higher imitation rates in the hands-free condition
are due to infants’ capability to execute the head action
when they support themselves with their hands on the table,
similarly to how the model demonstrated the action in this
condition. By contrast, 14-month-olds are unable to map
the head action when the model did not use her hands
for support, as that is how the model executed the head
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action in the hands-occupied condition, and are therefore less
likely to imitate in this condition (see [19], for an integrative
model that combines the teleological account and the two-
stage model of infant imitation). Similarly, the perceptual
distraction approach [20] also explains the phenomenon of
rational imitation by considering the more basic processes
at work, suggesting at it being selective rather than rational.
According to this approach, infants in the hands-occupied
condition are distracted by the unusual look of the blanket
tightly wrapped around the model’s torso.Therefore, they are
less able to focus on the modeled head action itself, resulting
in lower imitation in comparison to the hands-free condition,
wherein no comparable attentional interference is present.
Importantly, the four accounts have identical predictions of
infants’ overall imitation tendency in the classical one-trial
hands-free and hands-occupied conditions.
In the current study, we have, however, administered two
trials in each condition, instead of presenting infants with
each task only once.This could potentially influence imitation
rates in the hands-free and the hands-occupied conditions
differently according to the different theoretical accounts.
Following the principles of the teleological account [12] or the
mentalistic account [14], it is unlikely that a repeated presen-
tation of the unusual action in the hands-occupied condition
has any effect on infants’ imitation rates: Since the model is
still physically constrained, she still cannot use her hands. In
contrast, in the hands-free condition, the two accounts might
differ in their predictions. Since infants in the response phase
of the first trial learned that the hands are a very effective
means of operating the apparatus (see [10], for the finding
that virtually all participants used their hands when given the
chance to operate the apparatus), when observing the model
demonstrating the novel action despite her hands being free a
second time, infants might know that this cannot be the most
efficacious means. They might thus be less likely to imitate
in the second trial according to the teleological account.
Regarding the mentalistic account [14], the model’s use of her
head in the second trial of the hands-free condition might
emphasize her intentionality, whichmight lead to an increase
of imitation of the unusualmodeled action in the second trial.
An increase in imitation rate would be also expected by the
perceptual distraction account [20]. However, this increase
should take place in the hands-occupied condition, whereby
the repeated exposure to the demonstration decreases the
level of distraction by the blanket obscuring the hands in the
second trial. No differences in imitation level should occur
in the hands-free condition. In contrast, the two-stage model
of infant imitation [18] would predict similar imitation rates
in both trials in both conditions, as the action effect stays
constant across demonstrations and no change takes place
between trials which would improve infants’ ability to map
the observed action onto their own motor repertoire in the
second trial.
Infants’ ability to flexibly adapt their behavior to changing
contexts has been widely studied in paradigms other than
imitation, such as in the A-not-B task. These studies estab-
lished a continuous increase in the ability to switch with a
significant leap improvement at around one year of age (see,
e.g., [21]), which is the age at which infants start to engage
in selective imitation, when tested in a between-subjects
design [4]. Therefore, the question arises as to whether a
similar flexibility is present in their imitative behavior. The
purpose of the current study was to investigate infants’
reactive flexibility in terms of their ability to adapt their
imitative responses to changing situational constraints of the
model by presenting the same infants with both the hands-
free and the hands-occupied conditions within one testing
session. Previously, in studies that investigated infants’ ability
to adjust their behavior to changing contextual information,
the situational constraints that made infants display a flexible
behavior directly affected the infants. For example, 18-month-
olds relied selectively on the social cues of their caregivers
while descending on a challenging slope, depending on
whether they were wearing none, normal, or Teflon-soled
shoes to alter their locomotive abilities [22]. Infants used the
social information provided by their caregivers in challenging
situations, when they were uncertain of their motor abilities
but did not do so when they felt secure; that is, they adapted
their social information use behavior in accordancewith their
own physical circumstances. In contrast, in the current study
the constraints were applied only to the model and thereby
could only have an indirect influence on infants’ behavior.
As currently only one study has been published that
investigated whether selective imitative behavior of human
infants is present in a within-subjects design [14], one has
to be cautious in drawing far-reaching conclusions about the
extent of the behavior’s apparently adaptable nature on an
individual level.Therefore, the current study aims at examin-
ing whether infants can effectively adapt their own behavior
not only from one task to another (i.e., the head-touch and
the sit-touch task) but whether they do so with regard to
others’ alternating behavior in the light of their observable
constraints.This is important in order to identify the extent or
possible limits of infants’ learning abilities.The application of
a body-part imitation paradigmensures that infants’ response
behavior can be considered as true imitation and provides the
basis for a direct comparison to classical studies of selective
imitation. In the case that rational imitative behavior is
present in an adaptable form on an intrapersonal level at
the age of 14 months, infants would adapt their behavior in
accordance with the model’s changing physical constraints
when they are presented with both the hands-free and
the hands-occupied condition. Infants would overall display
higher imitation in the hands-free condition in comparison
to the hands-occupied condition. For the investigation of
which theoretical account (i.e., the teleological account, the
mentalistic account, the two-stage model of infant imitation,
or the perceptual distraction approach) might explain our
data best, we will analyze the first and second trials separately
and match our findings to the predictions outlined above.
2. Method
2.1. Participants. Eighty-two 14-month-olds participated in
the current study (M= 13months; 30 days; range = 13months;
2 days–14 months; 26 days; 48 girls). An additional 3 infants
were tested but had to be excluded from the analysis as they
had no valid trials due to inattentiveness (𝑛 = 1) or due
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to a combination of experimenter and apparatus error (𝑛 =
2). Infants were recruited from a database of parents who
volunteered to participate in child developmental studies at
a mid-sized German university.
2.2. Materials. For both the head-touch and the sit-touch
tasks, two apparatuses were used, one of which elicited a
melody and one that lit up when pressed on the top (a total
of four apparatuses) (Figure 1). The four apparatuses applied
in the two tasks were a head-touch sound apparatus (28 cm
long × 25.8 cm wide × 19.6 cm high; tilted at 50.5∘), a head-
touch light apparatus (22.6 cm long × 25.8 cm wide × 20 cm
high; tilted at 32.5∘; the lampmounted on the box was 11.5 cm
in diameter), a sit-touch sound apparatus (15.5 cm high ×
32.5 cm in diameter), and a sit-touch light apparatus (60.1 cm
long × 22 cm wide × 20.9 cm high). The experimenter (E,
always female, 𝑛 = 2) performed the head action on the
apparatuses while sitting at the table’s side adjacent to the
infant (as the head-touch apparatuses were tilted at angle,
the original setup whereby E sits opposite to the participant
could not be applied). She demonstrated the sit-touch action
in a similar sideway position to ensure a better view of the
demonstration.
2.3. Design and Procedure. Infants participated in two imita-
tion tasks wherein they observed the novel target actions of
the head touch and sit-touch (adapted from [17]). In a single
session, each task was presented in two successive trials, for
a total of four trials. Each trial entailed a demonstration
phase followed by an immediate response phase. A within-
subjects design was applied: infants observed one of the novel
actions executed in the hands-free condition and the other
in the hands-occupied condition. One action was executed
on a sound- and the other on a light apparatus. The order
of the tasks, the presented modalities, and the conditions
were counterbalanced across participants. Childrenwere ran-
domly assigned to one of eight possible groups, which were
created by counterbalancing the binary variables of condi-
tion, task, and modality of apparatus (Table 1).
After a ten-minute warm-up session, wherein the assis-
tant (A, always female, 𝑛 = 2) explained the procedure of
the study to the parent, A took her seat in the testing room
and waited for E to accompany participants into the testing
room. Throughout the study E played the role of the model,
andA’s taskwas to arrange the setup and place the apparatuses
in front of E and the infants. The inclusion of two differing
tasks was necessary, as infants at the age of 14 months have a
strong tendency to generalize their experiences in imitation
tasks from one situation to another [23]. In order to enable
comparison of the performance of infants in the current study
and that of enculturated chimpanzees, the current procedure
followed the procedure applied by Buttelmann et al. [17] as
closely as possible.
Before the first task, E used a small ball to play with the
infants for approximately 1-2 minutes in order to familiarize
them with the study room before starting the testing process.
After the completion of the first task (i.e., two trials), E
presented infants with a toy bear and played with them
shortly to provide time for A to change the room setting for
the second task (i.e., two trials).
Head-Touch Task. During the head-touch task, infants sat on
their parent’s lap adjacent to a table. While E turned away
from the table to remove the toy that she had used before
the task, A brought the head-touch apparatus and placed it
on the table in front of E’s seat (“So, this comes here”). After
turning back towards the table, E acknowledged the apparatus
(“Oh, great!”) and took her seat. She then shivered as if she
were cold and asked A for a blanket. What happened next
differed between conditions. In the hands-free condition, E
wrapped the dark blue blanket around her torso, then freed
her hands with the blanket still resting on her shoulders,
lifted her hands and slightly wiggled her fingers close to
the apparatus, signaling clearly to the infant that she could
freely move them, and placed them next to the apparatus
onto the table’s surface. After calling for the attention of the
infant (“Participant’s name, pay attention!”), E executed the
novel head-touch action. She turned on the apparatus to elicit
sound or light by pressing its top with her forehead, with the
pressing action lasting approximately 3 seconds. E performed
the demonstration three times. In case the child did not pay
attention to the actions, A signaled to E and she repeated
the demonstration to ensure that the infant observed three
of them. This was necessary to ensure that any differences
in infants’ imitative behavior were not due to their differing
experience level with the novel action. Additional repetition
of the demonstration was necessary for eight infants in eight
trials. After the demonstration phase, E turned her head
towards the infant, in front of whom A placed the apparatus,
and encouraged the child to play with it (“And now you!”).
The hands-occupied condition differed only in the actions
of the model with the blanket. After receiving the blanket
from A, E wrapped it around her body but kept her hands
underneath, holding the blanket from below. She kept her
hands in the same position, obscured under the blanket, until
the end of the second trial.
Sit-Touch Task. The sit-touch task took place on the floor.
After having played with the ball or the toy bear while the
infant sat on a small carpet on the floor, E instructed the
parent to take their child onto their lap and took the ball away.
While E walked to the side of the room with her back to the
infant in order to get a box, A placed the sit-touch apparatus
approximately 1.5 meters away from the infants’ carpet (“So,
this comes here”) and returned to her seat at the side of the
room. Upon her return, E acknowledged the apparatus (“Oh,
great!”). The procedure from this point onwards differed
between conditions. In the hands-free condition, E placed the
empty cardboard box, which she was holding in her hands
when returning to the centre of the room, next to her feet. She
then called for the child’s attention (“Participant’s name, pay
attention!”) and then demonstrated the novel sit-touch action
by squatting over and sitting on top of the apparatus three
times. Each sitting action lasted approximately 3 seconds.
Since all infants paid close attention, no additional repetition
of the demonstration for this task was necessary for any
of the infants. After the demonstration phase, E picked up
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Figure 1: The apparatuses used in the study: (a) head-touch sound apparatus; (b) head-touch light apparatus; (c) sit-touch sound apparatus;
(d) sit-touch light apparatus.
Table 1: Overview of the counterbalanced orders of tasks, conditions, and modalities.
Overall order number 1st task (2 consecutive trials) 2nd task (2 consecutive trials)
1 Head-touch, light, hands-free Sit-touch, sound, hands-occupied
2 Head-touch, light, hands-occupied Sit-touch, sound, hands-free
3 Sit-touch, sound, hands-free Head-touch, light, hands-occupied
4 Sit-touch, sound, hands-occupied Head-touch, light, hands-free
5 Sit-touch, light, hands-free Head-touch, sound, hands-occupied
6 Sit-touch, light, hands-occupied Head-touch, sound, hands-free
7 Head-touch, sound, hands-free Sit-touch, light, hands-occupied
8 Head-touch, sound, hands-occupied Sit-touch, light, hands-free
the box from the floor, took a seat on a chair opposite
the infant, placed the empty cardboard box next to herself,
and encouraged the child to engage with the apparatus
(“Participant’s name, now you!”). Parents had been previously
instructed to let their child down onto the carpet upon this
signal.
In the hands-occupied condition, E followed the same
procedure as in the hands-free condition, with the exception
that she kept the empty cardboard box in her hand while
carrying out the target sit-touch action, as well as when being
seated during the response periods of the task.
The response phase followed a standardized procedure
across all conditions, tasks, and modalities: an initial waiting
period of a maximum of 60 seconds within which time inac-
tive infants were encouraged by E to interact with the appa-
ratus at 10-second intervals (“Now you!”) was introduced
to control for personality traits, for example, shyness, which
were not in the interest of the current study. Following the
time of infants’ first touch of the apparatuses, the following
durationswere applied for the two imitation tasks: 60 seconds
for the head-touch and 120 seconds for the sit-touch task.This
deviation from the procedure of Buttelmann et al. [17] in the
current study was introduced because of the pilot findings of
Zmyj et al. [8] concerning human infants’ differing interest
in the apparatuses and the differing difficulty levels that the
tasks posed for them. In both tasks, from E’s signal, the infant
had 60 seconds to touch the top of the apparatus. If no touch
took place within this time period, the trial was over, and A
walked back to the table, took the apparatus (“And now it is
E’s turn again”), and placed it back in front of E. If the infant
touched the apparatus within the 60 seconds after E’s signal,
a 60-second/120 second response phase started from the time
of the first touch on the top of the apparatus, and A removed
the apparatus only after the entire response period elapsed.
The demonstration phase and the response period were then
repeated once more, following the identical procedure.
2.4. Coding and Analysis. The first author coded infants’
actions from recorded videotapes. The behavior of infants
with at least one valid trial (out of the four administered
trials), in which children interacted with the apparatus or
were inactive but had the entire 60 seconds waiting period
available to touch the apparatus, was included in the analysis,
which resulted in 272 of 328 possible data points (i.e., 82.93%
of all possible data points; 48 infants had 4 valid trials;
15 infants had 3 valid trials; 16 infants had 2 valid trials;
and 3 infants had 1 valid trial; in 192 trials were infants
inactive: 18 infants had 4 valid trials; 22 infants had 3 valid
trials; 23 infants had 2 valid trials; and 8 infants had 1 valid
trial). Infants who only had one valid trial or two valid
trials within the same condition were not excluded from the
analysis as their behavior can potentially contribute valuable
insights to imitation behavior on an interpersonal level and
were therefore included in the between-subjects analyses.
The remaining 56 trials were excluded from the analysis
due to infants being fussy (𝑛 = 25), experimenter error
(𝑛 = 14), apparatus failure (𝑛 = 12), or parental error
(𝑛 = 5).
The focus of interest was whether or not children reen-
acted the target actions. Firstly, in order to compare human
infants’ performance to that of enculturated chimpanzees [17]
and the evidence presented by Gergely et al. [10] the first
20 seconds of the response phase was analyzed. In addition,
infants’ behavior across the entire response period (i.e., head-
touch task: 60 seconds; sit-touch task: 120 seconds; similarly
to [8, 24]) was also of interest to determine whether results
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remained constant or infants displayed another behavioral
pattern beyond the classically investigated 20-second dura-
tion. An action was coded as a head-touch if infants touched
the lamp with any part of their head. According to a similar
principle, sit-touch was coded when children sat on the
sit-touch apparatus or attempted to do so by kneeling on
its top (see [8, 24]). For each valid trial infants received a
score that signaled whether the target action was imitated
(1) or not (0) to allow analysis of the individual trials. These
scores were then transformed into percentages, according
to task (head-touch/sit-touch), condition (hands-free/hands-
occupied), and modality (sound/light) and for the separate
blocks of trials, indicating for what proportion of the trials
infants replicated the observed actions (i.e., each infant
received on each block either 0% for not imitating the target
action, 50% for imitating in one trial, or 100% for imitating in
both trials of a task). A na¨ıve coder, blind to the purpose of the
study, coded 25% of the videos for the presence of the target
action in order to ensure the reliability of the coding. The
interrater agreement was excellent for both the head-touch
and the sit-touch task (20 seconds and entire response phase:
Cohen’s kappa of 1.0). Furthermore, the interrater agreement
was also excellent for the body part used to first touch the
apparatus (Cohen’s kappa of 1.0).
3. Results
3.1. Preliminary Analyses. No main effect of task order or
order of condition or of gender was present, either for the
20-seconds period or for the entire response period. Further-
more, no differences between tasks were revealed, either for
the 20-seconds response period or for the entire response
period. When examining the differences between modalities,
analysis revealed similar imitation behavior in the case of
the sound and the light apparatuses within the 20-second
response period and within the entire response period.
Additional analyses revealed that the only influence on
participants’ performance we found was that of order of
modalities at a trend level within the first 20 seconds (Mann–
Whitney = 472.50, 𝑁light-sound = 40, 𝑁sound-light = 30,
𝑝 = .057, 𝑟 = .23) and at a significant level across the full
response period (Mann–Whitney = 435.50,𝑁light-sound = 40,
𝑁sound-light = 30, 𝑝 = .019, 𝑟 = .28) (for description
see Table 2). Infants who started with the task involving
the sound modality did not display evidence of adaptable
imitative behavior between conditions. By contrast, those
who started with the light apparatus and received the sound
modality in the second block of trials imitated the target
actions significantly more often in the hands-free than in the
hands-occupied condition (20 seconds: Wilcoxon test, Z =
−2.81, 𝑁 = 40, 𝑝 = .005, 𝑟 = .44; entire response period:
Wilcoxon test, Z = −2.60, 𝑁 = 40, 𝑝 = .009, 𝑟 = .41; for
description see Table 2).
To examine whether imitation rates, in the separate
conditions, differed across trials within the single blocks, we
compared imitation rates in the first and the second trials of
each separate blocks. In the case that the first administered
block entailed the hands-free condition, imitation rates were
higher in the second trial than in the first trial of the same
block (20 seconds: 𝜒2 (1, 29) = 5.784, 𝑝 = .033; entire
response period:𝜒2 (1, 29) = 17.532,𝑝 < .0001, for description
see Table 3). In the case that the first administered block
utilized the hands-occupied condition, results yielded only
a trend within the first 20 seconds (𝜒2 (1, 33) = 15.984, 𝑝 =
.061). The analysis of the entire response period, however,
revealed a significantly higher imitation rate in the second
trial in comparison to the first trial (𝜒2 (1, 33) = 21.290, 𝑝 =
.006). The comparison of imitation rates in the hands-free
condition administered in the second block showed higher
imitation rates in the second trial than in the first (20 seconds:
𝜒2 (1, 27) = 12.420, 𝑝 = .017; entire response period: 𝜒2
(1, 27) = 14.850, 𝑝 = .003). The comparison of trials in
the hands-occupied condition administered in the second
block showed no difference in imitation rates between trials
within the first 20 seconds (𝜒2 (1, 31) = 5.373, 𝑝 = .161)
but revealed higher imitation rates in the second trial within
the duration of the entire response phase (𝜒2 (1, 31) = 7.330,
𝑝 = .045).
In order to rule out the idea that any difference in infants’
imitation rates between conditions might be the result of
infants’ differing success rate of turning on the apparatuses
by hand, we compared infants’ successful hand actions in
their active trials in the hands-free and the hands-occupied
conditions. We found that infants were able to successfully
turn on the apparatus at least once by using their hand in
the hands-free condition in 68.97% of the trials (SD = 43.76)
and in the hands-occupied condition in 63.93% of the trials
(SD = 46.67), which did not result in a difference between
conditions (Wilcoxon test, 𝑍 = −.929, 𝑁 = 48, 𝑝 = .353).
This means that a possible difference in infants’ imitation
between conditions is unlikely to be the result of a difference
in infants’ unsuccessful hand use between conditions.
3.2. Main Analyses. The novel focus of our study was to
investigate whether selective imitative behavior was also
present on an individual level in human infants. Upon
analyzing the first 20 seconds of the response period, infants’
rate of imitation differed significantly between conditions,
with a higher imitation rate in the hands-free than in the
hands-occupied condition (Wilcoxon test, Z = −2.327, 𝑁 =
70, 𝑝 = .02, 𝑟 = .28, Figure 2). The results were similar across
the entire response period, as the unusual actionwas imitated
at a higher rate in the hands-free condition than in the hands-
occupied condition (Wilcoxon test, Z = −2.288, 𝑁 = 70,
𝑝 = .022, 𝑟 = .27; Figure 2). Infants used first their hands in
98.3% of the first touches in the case of the head-touch task
and in 96.1% of the first touches in the case of the sit-touch
task.
In order to check whether infants’ performance differed
without any experience gained within the current experi-
ment, we analyzed the first administered block separately.
Selective imitation was also present on a between-subjects
level in infants’ first block of trials. The imitation rate of
the head- or sit-touch action was significantly higher in the
hands-free than in the hands-occupied condition (20 sec-
onds: Mann–Whitney U = 578.50,𝑁free = 38, 𝑁occupied = 40,
𝑝 = .005, 𝑟 = .32; entire response period: Mann–Whitney
U = 596.00, 𝑁free = 38, 𝑁occupied = 40, 𝑝 = .014, 𝑟 = .28)
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Table 2: Infants’ mean imitation rate depending on the administered order of modalities.
Light-sound Sound-light
20 seconds Entire response period 20 seconds Entire response period
Hands-free
M (SD)
Hands-occupied
M (SD)
Hands-free
M (SD)
Hands-occupied
M (SD)
Hands-free
M (SD)
Hands-occupied
M (SD)
Hands-free
M (SD)
Hands-occupied
M (SD)
22.5 (37.47) 5.0 (18.95) 30.0 (43.56) 8.8 (27.47) 13.3 (31.98) 11.7 (28.42) 15.0 (35.11) 15.0 (29.8)
Note. The table includes the data of infants, in two groups depending on the order of administered modalities. The numbers represent percentages of trials.
Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.
Table 3: Infants’ mean imitation rates dependent of condition in the single trials of the separate administered blocks.
Analyzed section of
response period
Hands-free condition Hands-occupied condition
1st administered trial
M (SD)
2nd administered trial
M (SD)
1st administered trial
M (SD)
2nd administered trial
M (SD)
1st administered block
of trials
20 seconds 18.9 (39.71) 26.67 (44.98) 2.63 (16.22) 5.71 (23.55)
Entire period 21.62 (41.73) 33.33 (47.94) 5.26 (22.63) 8.57 (28.40)
2nd administered
block of trials
20 seconds 10.81 (31.48) 13.79 (35.09) 6.06 (24.23) 15.15 (36.41)
Entire period 16.67 (37.80) 17.24 (38.44) 9.09 (29.19) 21.21 (41.51)
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Figure 2: Infants’ mean imitation rate within the first 20 seconds
of and during the entire duration of the response period across
tasks (within-subjects comparison). ∗ < .05. Note: the mean per-
centages refer to the number of trials rather than to the number of
participants; therefore no direct comparison can be made with the
mean percentages reported by Gergely et al. [10], only with that of
Buttelmann et al. [17].
(for description see Table 4). This difference in the first block
of trials was already apparent in the first administered trial,
as infants showed significantly alternating imitative behavior
from the beginning onwards, with a higher rate of imitation in
the hands-free in comparison to that of the hands-occupied
condition (20 seconds: 𝜒2 (1, 75) = 5.219, 𝑝 = .022; entire
response period: 𝜒2 (1, 75) = 4.341, 𝑝 = .037; for description
see Table 4). This replicates the results of Gergely et al.’s [10]
study within the first 20 seconds of the response period even
in the case of applying two unusual target actions instead
of only the classical head-touch task. The results remained
similar for the second trial of the block, where infants also
imitated the target actions also significantly more often in
the hands-free than in the hands-occupied condition (20
seconds: 𝜒2 (1, 65) = 5.448, 𝑝 = .02; entire response period:
𝜒2 (1, 65) = 6.19, 𝑝 = .013; for description see Table 4).
3.3. Comparison to Previous Studies. In addition, we wanted
to assess whether we replicated the results of the previous
studies upon which we based our design. In order to enable
a direct comparison between the results of Gergely et al.’s
[10] and the current study, firstly the imitative behavior of
those infants who received the head-touch light apparatus as
the first task was analyzed. These infants received the same
task with the same modality as 14-month-olds in Gergely
et al.’s [10] study with no prior experience of the other novel
target action, that is, the sit-touch, within the framework of
the study. Similarly to Gergely et al.’s [10] study, infants in
the current study imitated the head touch significantly more
often in the hands-free than in the hands-occupied condition
within the first 20 seconds of the response period even on
the first administered trial (Chi-square test, 𝜒2 (1, 22) = 7.062,
𝑝 = .008, for description see Table 4). The results remained
the same for the entire response period (Chi-square test,
𝜒2 (1, 22) = 7.062, 𝑝 = .008, for description see Table 4).
Furthermore, the imitation rates of this subgroup of infants
were also higher in the hands-free condition than in the
hands-occupied condition for the first administered block of
trials (20 seconds: Mann–Whitney test, U = 28.0, 𝑁free = 9,
𝑁occupied = 14, 𝑝 = .002, 𝑟 = .64; entire response period:
Mann–Whitney test, U = 30.50, 𝑁free = 9, 𝑁occupied = 14,
𝑝 = .008, 𝑟 = .56) (for description see Table 4). We thereby
not only replicated the findings of Gergely et al. [10] but also
extended those to a longer response period and to a block of
two repeated trials.
As we adapted the experimental design from Buttelmann
et al. [17], in the second step we analyzed the imitative behav-
ior of those infants who received the light apparatuses in
the first block, as enculturated chimpanzees always received
the light apparatus before the sound apparatus in order to
compare our results to those of the study with enculturated
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Table 4: Infants’ mean imitation rates.
Analyzed response period Analyzed section ofresponse period
Condition
Hands-free
M (SD)
Hands-occupied
M (SD)
1st administered block of trials overall
(% of trials, between-subjects)
20 seconds 21.05 (36.08) 3.75 (17.5)
Entire period 25.0 (41.51) 6.25 (23.17)
1st administered trial
(% of subjects, between-subjects)
20 seconds 18.92 (39.71) 2.63 (16.22)
Entire period 21.62 (41.73) 5.26 (22.53)
2nd administered trial
(% of subjects, between-subjects)
20 seconds 26.67 (44.98) 5.71 (23.55)
Entire period 33.33 (47.95) 8.57 (28.4)
1st trial head-touch task, light condition, as the 1st task
(% of subjects, between-subjects)
20 seconds 44.44 (52.7) 0.0 (0.0)
Entire period 44.44 (52.7) 0.0 (0.0)
Head-touch task (both trials), light condition, as the 1st task
(% of trials, between-subjects)
20 seconds 44.44 (46.4) 0.0 (0.0)
Entire period 50.0 (50.0) 3.57 (13.36)
1st administered block of trials, light condition
(% of trials, within-subjects)
20 seconds 20.45 (36.28) 4.65 (18.3)
Entire period 27.27 (42.39) 8.14 (26.57)
chimpanzees. Fourteen-month-olds, similarly to encultur-
ated chimpanzees, reenacted the novel target action signifi-
cantlymore often in the hands-free condition than the hands-
occupied conditionwithin the first 20 seconds of the response
period (Wilcoxon test, Z = −2.810, 𝑁 = 40, 𝑝 = .005,
𝑟 = .44, for description see Table 4). Furthermore, our results
replicated those of Buttelmann et al. [17] when analyzing the
entire response period (Wilcoxon test, Z = −2.60, 𝑁 = 40,
𝑝 = .009, 𝑟 = .41, for description see Table 4).
4. Discussion
Themain focus of the current studywas to examine the adapt-
ability of selective imitative behavior in 14-month-olds on an
individual level. Our study yielded evidence that 14-month-
olds adapt their imitative behavior in accordance with the
physical constraints of a model upon examining the first 20
seconds of the response period. Additionally, we found selec-
tive body-part imitation even for an extended duration of the
entire response phase. Focusing on subgroups of participants,
we replicated the findings of Gergely and colleagues [10] as
well as Buttelmann and colleagues [17]. More specifically, our
14-month-old infants tailored their behavior in accordance
with the model’s physical constraints across conditions that
were administered to them with a very short time delay.
This short time delay demanded from infants the ability to
immediately adapt their imitative responses in accordance
with the model’s changing constraints. Participants in the
current study imitated the unusual target action significantly
more often if the model demonstrated the action as her
free choice than in the case when she was forced to do so
because of some physical constraint. These findings suggest
that preverbal infants, similarly to enculturated chimpanzees
[17], have the capability of adapting their imitation of novel
observed actions based on their perception of the constraints
under which an action is modeled.
In the current studywe replicated and extended a number
of previous findings regarding selective imitation, for exam-
ple, those of Gergely et al. [10]. That is, infants who received
the head-touch light apparatus as the first administered task
in the hands-free condition displayed a higher imitation rate
within the first 20 seconds of their first trial than those infants
who received the identical task and apparatus in the hands-
occupied condition. This pattern remained constant even
for the entire duration of the response period. We further
extended these findings by additionally focusing on the
adaptable nature of the skill on an individual level wherebywe
administered two target actions in two differing conditions to
each participant. The results of our study show that selective
imitation (irrespective of the underlyingmechanism) is a true
phenomenon, rather than a result of accidently allocating
infants who are likely to imitate into the hands-free and
the nonimitators into the hands-occupied condition. Infants
predominantly imitated the target actions when they had
observed them being carried out in the hands-free condition,
wherein the use of the unusual body part was a freely chosen
means that the model seemed to prefer over hand use.
Imitation of the target actions was observed in spite of the
predominant use of the most straightforward means, that is,
the hands, as infants’ first action (see also [10], for a similar
finding). In contrast, the lower imitation rates in the hands-
occupied condition suggest that when physical constraints
were observable infants recognized that the model had to
use a means other than the hands to operate the box (i.e.,
by her head or by sitting on it). As participants’ hands were
always free, they had the possibility of opting for using their
hands to push the lid of the apparatus.These findings are also
consistent with preverbal infants’ selective tool-use tendency
[14]. Importantly, as children engaged in similar behavior
in both the head- and the sit-touch task, the extent of the
adaptable nature of imitative skills is further highlighted
across task types of body-part imitation paradigms.
Adapting the study design of Buttelmann et al. [17]
enables the direct comparison of human infants’ and encul-
turated chimpanzees’ imitative behavior. Those infants, who
started with the light modality in the current study (i.e.,
the same modality order as the one that enculturated
chimpanzees received) showed a similar imitative response
like did the chimpanzees in Buttelmann et al.’s [17] study.
Moreover, not only this subgroup’s performance but also the
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performance of all infants in the current study showed a
similar pattern to that of enculturated chimpanzees. In both
cases, higher imitation of the demonstrated unusual action
was observed in the hands-free condition in comparison to
the hands-occupied condition, suggesting that both preverbal
human infants and enculturated chimpanzees adapted their
imitative behavior on the basis of the observed physical
constraints of themodel. In contrast, the behavioral pattern in
the single trials shows a differing picture. While enculturated
chimpanzees displayed higher imitation rates in their first
trial than in their second trial in the hands-free condition,
we found for infants a higher level of imitation in the second
trial in this condition. Our results follow the same pattern as
the findings of Schwier et al. [3], suggesting that while some
enculturated chimpanzees may have learned across repeated
trials that the use of the unusual body part was unnecessary,
children’s behavior was not steered by the same learning
mechanism. Taking into account toddlers’ and preschoolers’
tendency to copy modeled actions irrespective of a model’s
circumstances or the necessity of all of the demonstrated
single steps [25], it seems possible that 14-month-old infants
not only imitate in order to learn how to operate a novel
device but also do so in order to affiliate with the model [26].
Great apes, in contrast, seem to lack this social motivation
and therefore stop imitating as soon as they figure out all
possible ways to operate the novel device and then go for their
own choice of means (e.g., [24, 27]).
Four theoretical accounts provide an explanation to the
behavioral pattern found by Gergely et al. [10] (i.e., the
teleological account [12], the mentalistic account [14], the
two-stage model of infant imitation [18], or the perceptual
distraction account [20]). As stated earlier, the current study
was not directly aimed at resolving the question which
of these accounts is correct. In the hands-free condition,
regardless whether it was administered in the first or in the
second block, within both the first 20 seconds and within
the duration of the entire response period, imitation rates
were higher in the second than in the first trials. This would
be in line with the principles of the mentalistic account
[14], as the increase in the imitation rate might suggest
infants’ interpretation of the repeated demonstration of the
unusual target action in the second trial as an emphasis on
the intentional nature of the modeled action. This increase
in imitation rates would, however, not be predicted by the
teleological [12], the perceptual distraction account [20], or
the two-stage model of infant imitation [18], as the model’s
rationality, motor action, or the appearance of the blanket did
not change between trials. In the hands-occupied condition,
the similar imitation rates in the first and second trial within
the first 20 seconds provide support for the mentalistic [14]
and the teleological account [12] and could also be explained
by the two-stagemodel of infant imitation [18], as themodel’s
physical constraints remained constant. It contradicts the
prediction of the perceptual distraction account [20], as the
position of the blanket remained the same across trials,
and due to infants’ habituation it should have presented a
lower level of distraction in the second trial. This pattern,
however, turned around when examining the entire duration
of the response period. The increased imitation rate in the
second trial is consistent solely with the prediction of the
latter account. As the perceptual distraction account would
suggest, infants might have habituated across the first trial
to the unusual appearance of the blanket around the model’s
torso and been less distracted from the demonstrated head
action in the second trial. Alternatively, a longer response
period during which the model looks at the infant might
result in a higher social pressure, whereby infants feel as
they are expected to imitate the observed unusual action
[26]. However, rather than solely relying on the comparison
of single trials, developing conditions wherein the accounts
would expect different rates of imitation (e.g., the button
condition in [28], for a critical overview of the study see [29])
and presenting them to infants in future studies in a within-
subjects design could help disentangling the alternative
explanations. These mixed results emphasize the necessity of
expanding the pool of studies by applying not only various
tasks and conditions but also a variety of response durations.
When analyzing our data for effects of the tasks, the
modalities, or any of the orders in which those were applied,
we found that infants predominantly imitated the observed
novel action more often in the hands-free than the hands-
occupied conditionwhen they had the opportunity to interact
first with a light apparatus.These findingsmight be explained
by the differing demands that the various applied modalities
placed on infants’ attention. Based on findings that show
whether or not an action results in an observable effect shapes
the rate of imitation (e.g., [30, 31]), it is likely that also the
effect type influences imitative behavior. When presented
with auditory-visual compounds infants prioritize the pro-
cessing of auditory stimuli over that of visual stimuli [32, 33].
This preference of processing auditory stimuli over visual
stimuli when presented in parallel is due to attentional factors
[34]. As the presence of an auditory stimulus is usually shorter
than that of a visual one, it is reasonable to focus attention
on what is audible rather than on what is visible. This makes
sense especially early in the maturational process of attention
abilities when attentional resources are limited.This resource
allocation on the outcome of the modeled action, however,
could potentially lead to a decreased level of attention paid
to the visually observed action and its circumstances, which
then might lead to a lower imitation rate.
An alternative explanation relies on a possible conflict
of interest in the apparatus and in the unusual target action
(see perceptual distraction account, [20]). In case of the
light apparatus, the action effect was immediately visually
connected to the demonstrated target action. Infants could
directly observe how pushing the top of the light-boxes
resulted in a light effect. In contrast, the location of the
sound was not directly observable. It seems possible that the
lack of observable location of the sound resulted in infants
shifting their focus from imitating the target action to man-
ually exploring the sound object (manual exploration and
manipulation of objects is a behavior that is present already
within the first year of life, see, e.g., [35]). Further research
is necessary to establish how the differing action effect
modalities and the demonstrated first action might influence
infants’ imitative behavior on the second task in spite of the
fact that the utilized tasks and modalities were introduced
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to reduce possible carry-over effects. It is important to point
out, however, that the study of Buttelmann et al. [17] did
not include an order where the sound modality has been
administered as the first modality of the task (i.e., in their
study all subjects saw the light version of each task as the first
modality). Therefore, it remains unclear how far the order
of the administered modalities (presented in a randomized
manner) influences great apes’ imitative behavior. This order
effect of modalities, thus, encourages further research to be
conducted with human and nonhuman participants in the
research of selective imitation across different modalities that
include attentional input via only one or more channels.
Until now, to the best of our knowledge, no study has uti-
lized the sit-touch task with infants younger than 14 months.
The task would be, however, suitable for 12-month-olds
(the youngest age group to date wherein selective imitative
behavior has been observed [4]), as some childrenmaster the
skill of walking around their first birthday [36]. Applying the
identical tasks in order to reveal whether selective imitative
behavior is present in an adaptable form even at 12 months of
age or whether this aspect of the skill develops after infants’
first birthday would shed more light into the ontogenetic
development of the adaptability of selective imitation.
The importance of the present study lies in showing
that selective imitative skills are adaptable when preverbal
infants face novel behaviors demonstrated under opposing
conditions. They can selectively imitate the use of unusual
body parts not only across conditions, but also across tasks,
which further emphasizes the adaptable nature of the skill
even within a short timeframe. Being able to quickly adapt
one’s own behavior in the light of the circumstances that the
demonstrator of an action faces enables infants to selectively
imitate and learn only actions that are carried out intention-
ally. These actions are potentially important for the imitator
to learn as they might be part of their social group’s specific
action repertoire.
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